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ABSTRACT
Investigating the Dynamics of Violent Attacks on Health Care During the Ebola Outbreak in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, August 2018 – January 2020
By
Sydney Nicole Adams
April 26, 2020

Background: The Democratic Republic of Congo is actively experiencing its tenth outbreak of
Ebola Virus Disease. This outbreak is the second-largest in history. This outbreak of Ebola virus
is taking place in North Kivu and Ituri provinces in the eastern part of the country. The North
Kivu and Ituri provinces are two of the most populous, conflict-torn, provinces in the DRC, and
border three other countries, Rwanda, Uganda, and South Sudan. This current outbreak has been
marked by numerous attacks against health care services and the inability to bring this outbreak
to a swift end like the outbreak in Équateur province DRC.
Aim: The intent of this thesis is to quantify the frequency of attacks on health care using publicly
available data in order to have a better understanding of how violent attacks towards health care
are impacting the Ebola response efforts in North Kivu and Ituri provinces.
Methods: This study is a cross-sectional examination of data collected from publicly available
resources to characterize the violence towards the Ebola response teams. This study includes data
from the Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care published by the World Health
Organization, data collected from local media outlets, social media, international organizations,
universities, and non-profit organizations.
Results: There were 102 attacks that were confirmed to have taken place in one of the two
affected provinces. The peak of violence towards health care in the DRC occurred during May
2019. Health care facilities were the most affected health care resource. Also, more attacks
occurred in North Kivu province compared to Ituri Province.
Conclusion: Our study, one of the first to demonstrate the prevalence and context of violent
attacks related to health care resources and delivery during a health crisis, indicates the need for
deliberate planning and preventative measures when mitigating an infectious disease outbreak
during an active conflict.
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Introduction
Ebola virus disease (EVD) is a hemorrhagic fever that commonly infects humans and nonhuman primates. EVD is extremely fatal, with mortality rates ranging from 25 to 90%.1 EVD
belongs to the Filoviridae family and the Ebolavirus genus. Among the Ebolavirus genus, there
are five distinct species which are: Zaire ebolavirus (ZEBOV), Sudan ebolavirus (SEBOV), Taï
Forest ebolavirus (TEBOV), Reston ebolavirus (REBOV), and Bundibuyo ebolavirus (BEBOV).
Only ZEBOV, SEBOV, and BEBOV have caused outbreaks in humans with ZEBOV having the
highest fatality rates recorded in humans.2 EVD was discovered in 1976 two simultaneous
outbreaks occurred in Sudan and Zaire (now known as the Democratic Republic of Congo). The
two outbreaks of EVD was relatively close geographically, but the viruses were not
epidemiologically linked and were later identified as two distinct species of virus, SEBOV and
ZEBOV respectively.1 In the time since it was discovered in 1976, there have been 23 confirmed
outbreaks of EVD, predominantly occurring in sub-Saharan Africa.1,2
EVD is zoonotic with frequent spillovers into humans, non-human primates, and other
animal populations. There is evidence to support the claim that the natural host for EVD is bats,
particularly bats belonging to the Pteropodidae family; however, there has yet to be virus isolated
from bats found in natural conditions.2 Humans are likely infected by coming into close contact
with bats or other deceased animals such as chimpanzees or other wild game. After the initial
spillover event, the disease can be spread by human-to-human transmission via bodily fluids.
Caring for those who are sick or coming into close contact with dead bodies is associated with a
high risk for disease transmission because of the likelihood of coming into direct contact with
bodily fluids.2 Because bodily fluids are very infectious, the risk of nosocomial transmission is
very high; therefore, it is essential that appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) be used
when treating EVD patients. The incubation period is 2-21 days, and there are three phases of the
disease. Phase one is defined by an acute non-specific viral illness where patients will experience
symptoms such as malaise, fatigue, and body aches.2,3 During the second phase of the disease is
dominated by gastrointestinal symptoms such as nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea, at this stage
many patients will become dehydrated.2,3 After the second week of illness, some patients will
begin to recover; however some will begin to deteriorate among those who do not recover,
patients will proceed to the third stage, which is shock possibly due to hypovolaemia and a
systemic inflammatory response, some patients may also experience neurological manifestations
9

during this stage.2,3 At this point, some patients will begin to experience hemorrhage; however,
during the 2013-2016 West Africa outbreak, this wasn’t common.2 Many other common diseases
can have similar symptoms as EVD such as influenza, malaria, or typhoid fever.4
On July 28, 2018 a notification was sent from the North Kivu Provincial Health division to
the Ministry of Health in the Democratic Republic of Congo detailing a cluster of acute
hemorrhagic fever cases.5 On August 1, 2018 the Institut National de Recherche Biomédicale
(INRB) in Kinshasa reported that of the six samples that were collected from the patients who
were hospitalized Mabalako Health Zone in North Kivu, four tested positive for EVD. 5 This
marked the beginning of the 10th outbreak of EVD in the DRC since it’s discovery in 1976. The
outbreak in the North Kivu Province was officially declared on August 1, 2018 one week after
the 9th outbreak in the Équateur province was declared as ending.
There are several reasons that the outbreak in North Kivu and Ituri Provinces is unique. One
being that North Kivu province is one of the most populous provinces in the DRC with 8 million
inhabitants and shares a border with not only four other provinces in the DRC (Ituri, South Kivu,
Maniema, and Tshopo) but it also shares a border with Uganda and Rwanda.6 Second being that
this outbreak is occurring in a conflict zone. The eastern region of the DRC has experienced
sustained violence since the 1960s when the DRC gained its independence from Belgium. There
were at least 40 armed groups active in the eastern DRC as of October 2013.7 Due to the
prolonged and sustained violence there is an atmosphere of mistrust among communities of the
Ebola response efforts.8 This mistrust and suspicion has fueled the violence in the region. Due to
this violence there are an estimated 1 million internally displaced persons in the region and a
continuous exodus of refugees to neighboring countries such as Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania.6
Third, not only is the region experiencing an EVD outbreak it has also co-currently been
experiencing a cholera, monkeypox, and vaccine-derived polio virus type 2 outbreaks.9
Purpose of the Study
This Ebola outbreak in the eastern DRC is unique. It is the first time an EVD outbreak has
occurred in an active conflict zone. In a study done by Masumbuko Claude Underschultz and
Hawkes, researchers demonstrated the pervasiveness of resistance to the EVD response and the
abundance of mistrust in the community.8 This resistance has taken many forms but notably has
manifested in violence towards health care services and workers. The amount of attacks that
have targeted health care resources in some capacity is alarming. Even though there is an
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effective vaccine to prevent EVD infection, it has not been enough to end this outbreak. One of
the significant contributors to the continuation of this outbreak is believed to be the attacks that
target health care resources. The amount of violence towards the Ebola response seen in this
outbreak was not seen in such extremes in the last Ebola outbreak in the Équateur province in the
Democratic Republic of Congo in 2018. In a study by Wells and colleagues, researchers
demonstrated that if the ring vaccination strategy that was used to control the Ebola outbreak in
the Équateur Province had been eroded or impeded in some way it would degrade the
effectiveness of the vaccine campaign to control the spread of the disease. 11
To have a better understanding of how this violence has impacted the ability to contain this
outbreak it is important to understand how often these attacks have happened, what resources are
they affecting, and when these attacks reached their peak. The intent of this thesis is to quantify
the frequency of attacks on health care sourced from publicly available data to have a better
understanding of the dynamics of this EVD outbreak and the impact violence is having on the
containment of this outbreak.
Research Questions
Characterization of the type and frequency of violent attacks towards health care in the
Democratic Republic of Congo during the 2018-2020 Ebola outbreak will be achieved by
answering the following questions:
1. What was the prevalence of violent attacks against health care?
2. Did the pattern and frequency of violence vary?
3. What health care resources were targeted by these violent attacks?
4. What organizations or persons were responsible for violent attacks?
5. Did violent attacks impede response activities?
Review of the Literature
This thesis will explore the dynamics of violence towards health care during outbreaks of
infectious diseases. Specifically, the violence targeted towards health care during the Ebola
outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 2018-2020. The literature review presented
here describes the current knowledge of the violence experienced in the region before the
outbreak began, and violence towards health care during other outbreaks of infectious disease in
countries facing similar challenges.
Conflict in North Kivu and Ituri Provinces
11

The eastern DRC has been embroiled in conflict since the DRC gained its independence
from Belgium in the 1960s. When the Belgium colonial rule ended, they left the country with
little social or economic development.10 Shortly after the country’s first national election in May
1960, Joseph Mobutu, the country’s Chief of Staff of the Army, seized power in a military coup,
he suspended the parliament and had the first democratically elected prime minister executued.10
Mobutu officially took control of the country in 1965. Mobutu’s thirty-two-year long reign was
defined by corruption and economic mismanagement; his reign would come to an end before the
First Congo War.10 Prior to the First Congo War (1996-1997) there were long-standing ethnic
and political tensions in the North Kivu and Ituri Region that led to other conflicts. One of the
many ethnic conflicts that plagued the eastern region was the tensions between Rwandan
immigrants (Hutu and Tutsi) and those who considered themselves indigenous .12 Many of these
immigrants had been brought in by the Belgians to work and continued to live in the DRC after
the Belgians left. Even though the Rwandan immigrants’ children were born in the DRC, they
were perceived as outsiders by many. Also, because of the Rwandan Genocide many of
Rwandan Tutsi refugees who were fleeing violence came to the DRC, and after the Hutu
rebellion was squashed, many of the Hutu rebels also fled to the DRC. These tensions resulted in
numerous conflicts and killings up to 1997.12 After the end of the First Congo War, Laurent
Kabila took power, he led the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour las Liberation du Congo
(AFDL) which was backed by Rwanda and Uganda.13
The Second Congo War began in 1998 and lasted until 2003. This conflict was described
as Africa's first world war, and not only involved DRC based groups but was an international
conflict involving neighboring countries such as Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, Chad, Sudan,
Namibia, and Zimbabwe.10,13 The fighting was rooted in ethnic and political conflicts and the
desire to harness the regions valuable natural resources.10 During this conflict the eastern part of
the country was controlled by the opposition forces and the west was controlled by the DRC
government. With the country de facto partitioned Kabila partnered with ex-Rwandan forces and
Congolese guerillas, the Mai-Mai.12 At this point the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition was beginning
to falter and splinter into new groups. During the stalemate a humanitarian crisis was growing,
and pressure began to build from outside influences, such as Libya and South Africa, to bring
this war to an end. In 2002 a peace agreement was reached following the assassination of the
county's leader Laurent Kabila and his son, Joseph Kabalia's assumption of power. The Second
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Congo War officially ended in 2003. Throughout the First and Second Congo Wars the eastern
Congo served as a battle ground for many of the fights during the war. Following the withdrawal
of Ugandan and Rwandan forces after the peace agreement, new fighting started in Ituri
province. There were more than 400 killed, and 75,000 people fled the region, the fighting
threatened to overturn the peace agreement and threatened the new democratic government.
Many were worried the fighting would result in genocide. After this, the EU voted to send in
troops to provide relief.
There were many problems in the eastern country after the peace agreement was reached.
Three of the main problems were 1. Militias were continuing to operate in the region and splinter
even though they had agreed to lay down their arms 2. There was no national army that could
defend the country from internal or external threats, and 3. there was no nationalized police force
to defend civilians and enforce law and order.10 There were many civil and human rights
violations that occurred during and after the fighting. Throughout the 2000s and 2010s countless
rebel groups and the Congolese army (FARDC) committed numerous and widespread violations
of the laws of war against civilians. The years of sustained violence had created an enormous
refugee crisis. Not only was the violence in the DRC creating a refugee crisis there, but refugees
from neighboring countries (such as Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, and Angola) were also fleeing to
the DRC.9 This prolonged violence experienced by the region has led to lawless and distrust in
institutional authorities.
On top of the ongoing conflict there are significant humanitarian and public health issues
facing the DRC. Between October 2017 and September 2019 there were 5.01 million internally
displaced persons in this region.14 During April 2019 alone more than 100,000 people fled their
homes in the North Kivu province due to insecurity.14 This insecurity was created by fighting
around Kamango near the town of Beni and the Congolese Army fighting Mai-Mai armed groups
in Lubero Territory. North Kivu province in the DRC remains one of the most conflict ridden,
and displacement affected regions in the country. It has experienced the highest number of
reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence in the country and is now experiencing
the second largest outbreak of EVD in history.14,15
Attacks on Health Care
Attacks by armed actors on aspects of health care are not a phenomenon that is new to
this outbreak. Recently, we have witnessed widespread attacks on health care facilities and
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personnel during the Syrian and Yemen conflicts; however, this violence targeting health care
responses can be traced as far back as the Bosnia and Herzegovina war (1992-1995). Even
though attacks on health care can be traced back to at least 1992 it appears that these attacks have
become more frequent during the Syria and Yemen conflicts.16 An example of the type of
violence towards health care seen during the Syrian civil war are target attacks by the Russian
government and the Syrian Government on hospitals in rebel-controlled territory.17 Even though
these attacks have been denied by both the Assad Regime and Russia, there was no denying that
these attacks were intentional, organized, and used major weaponry such as air-to-surface
missiles, cluster munitions, barrel bombs, and incendiaries which may be difficult for other
groups to obtain.
Compared to the attacks on health care during the Syrian and Yemen wars the attacks in
the DRC appear to different. The attacks on health care in the DRC appear to be perpetrated by a
mixture of local militias, structured rebel groups, and community members who do not trust the
Ebola response efforts. This mixture of actors involved in the violence towards health care
workers can make this a more difficult problem to solve. The violence that is targeted towards
health care here range from setting fire to Ebola Treatment Centers (ETCs) during an armed
attack, murdering a WHO epidemiologist, to psychological threats of violence to health care
staff.18,19 However, violence towards health care in the DRC is similar to some violence targeted
towards health care staff during the 2014-2016 EVD outbreak in West Africa.
In 2015 the World Health Organization (WHO) establish a surveillance system for
attacks on health care under the Attacks on Health Care Initiative (AHC). The mission of this
surveillance system is to systematically collect information on attacks against health care across
the globe, as well as the attack’s immediate impact on health care in countries facing
emergencies, and to make this data available for use. The surveillance system also routinely
publishes reported on data tends and analysis and makes this information publicly available. The
WHO defines an attack against health care as “any act of verbal or physical violence, or
obstruction that interferes with the availability, access and delivery of curative and/or
preventative health services.” (WHO SSA, p. 7).20,21 The SSA is publicly available; however, the
information for the attacks in each country do not contain location specific information, it is only
country wide. The information also does not include any specifics about who perpetrated the
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violent attack, or the specific name of the resource affected such as the name of the health care
facility.
Social Resistance to the Ebola Response efforts
Since the declaration of the Ebola outbreak in the eastern DRC on August 1, 2018, it has
been fraught with resistance and violence from the community and other armed actors. This
region of the DRC has experienced prolonged civil unrest and humanitarian crises. Several
researchers during this outbreak have sought to explain why there is so much social resistance to
the EVD outbreak response. Vinick. Pham, Bindu, and Bedford, sought to explore the
association between institutional trust and the adoption of preventative measures and whether
belief in misinformation related to EVD is associated with a lack of willingness to adopt
preventative measures.22 Researchers conducted a population-based survey one month after the
outbreak was declared. The survey took place in two cities that were affected by the outbreak
Beni and Butembo. Researchers found that overall, there was a lack of trust in administrative
leaders with the most trust in local leaders, and then decreasing amounts of trust in city,
provincial, to national leaders. Most participants had heard some form of misinformation related
to the EVD response such as Ebola does not exist (86.5%), Ebola is fabricated for financial gains
(84.7%), Ebola is fabricated to destabilize the region (86.1%). One-fourth of respondents
believed in the statement that Ebola does not exist (25.5%), 32.6% believed that it was fabricated
for financial gain, and 36.4% believed it was fabricated to destabilize the region. However, most
participants reported that they would seek some sort of formal care if they believed they had
contacted EVD instead of informal care. In conclusion, researchers reported that the adherence to
preventative measures was high, highlighting the importance of the mass communication
campaigns initiated at the beginning of the outbreak. Researchers also highlighted that their
study reinforces the importance of community trust and that the best way to ensure the
community trusts the response efforts is to make sure that there is community buy-in and
community engagement.
Masumbuko Claude and colleagues also conducted a similar study to examine the social
resistance to EVD control efforts during the outbreak in the eastern DRC.8 They conducted a
mixed methods study using focus group discussions (FGDs) and a 18 item survey questionnaire.
The participants in the FDGs were selected from a convenience sample of people living in the
regions affected by the outbreak, participants were 18 years or older, and the FDGs were
15

conducted during the fourth month of the epidemic. The questionnaire was developed using past
questionnaires that were used in Guinea and the DRC and were also informed by the results from
the FGDs. The survey participants were also selected from a convenience sample, participants
were selected by the surveyors, who were leaders among medial students at a local university in
Butembo. The questionnaire collected participant demographic information as well as several
key domains related to social resistance to EVD control efforts. These domains were: perceived
risk of EVD, denial of biomedical discourse, dissatisfaction and mistrust of EVD response team,
vaccine acceptability and community engagement, support for incidents of overt hostility, and
intentions to comply with control efforts in case of EVD illness or death in family. Researchers
concluded that their survey results suggested that a substantial minority of respondents supported
views suggestive of resistance, and that resistance was associated with denial of the biomedical
discourse and dissatisfaction/mistrust of the EVD response team. And that this mistrust and
resistance many lead to a decreased willingness to comply with EVD control efforts such as
isolation and vaccination.
This, however, is not the first Ebola outbreak to encounter social resistance. During the
2013-2016 EVD outbreak in west Africa there was increased social resistance to EVD response
efforts in Guinea compared to Sierra Leone.23 Researchers noted that even though Guinea and
Sierra Leone share several cultural similarities there was stark differences in the social resistance
to the EVD response. Researchers concluded that these differences in response to the EVD
outbreak can be explained by their contrasting political practices and the legacies that French
direct rile and British indirect rule made on the countries.
Social resistance to outbreak response activities is not something new. In an article by
Cohn and Kutalek researchers examined the parallels between Cholera epidemics in Europe
during the 19th century and the EVD outbreak in West Africa.24 They cite the lack of community
trust and failures in communication, lack of engagement with local communities, adverse
publicity, and stained relationships between local populations, governmental authorities, and
outside agencies as drivers for violence in the present and in the past. The summary of articles
used in this literature review can be found in Table 1.
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Table 1. Summary of literature review for attacks on health care during the Ebola outbreak in the
DRC from August 2018 – January 2020
Author(s)
Year
Location
Important Points or Findings
Afzal & Jafar 2019
Multiple
-Researchers aimed to explore what is known of the
Countries
impacts of attacks on health care
Briody et al.
2018
Multiple
-Researchers sought to identify if the number of
Countries
attacks targeting health care in Syria and Yemen were
more frequent than in past conflicts
-They examined conflicts in six middle- and highincome countries over the past 30 years
-Researchers concluded that the number of facilities
attacked was the highest in Syria suggesting that these
types of attacks had increased compared to previous
conflicts.
Czuperski et
2017
Syria
-Overview of attacks on health care in Syria during the
al.
civil war
Cohn &
2016
West
-Community mistrust to EVD outbreak is not a new
Kutalek
Afria;
phenomenon
Europe
-Community mistrust in countries affected by EVD
outbreak mirror mistrust in Europe of Cholera from
1830 – 20th century
Dobbins, et al. 2008
Multiple
-Exploration of the history of European intervention in
Countries; the DRC since the civil war in 1997
DRC
-Researchers look at some of the precursors of war and
challenges that are faced today in a post-conflict DRC
Masumbuko
2019
DRC
-Researchers explored social resistance to EVD
Claude et al.
control measures implemented during the 2018-2019
EVD outbreak in the Eastern DRC
-Qualitative data was collected through focus group
discussion. Quantitative data was collected through
survey.
- Significant proportion of those surveyed backed
views suggestive of resistance, and that this was
associated with mistrust of EVD response
-Resistance to response may provide opportunity for
continuing transmission of EVD
Vinck et al.
2019
DRC
-Researchers wanted to gain a better understanding on
if institutional trust is associated with the adoption of
preventative measures and whether belief in EVD
misinformation is associated with lower adoption of
EVD preventative measures
-One in four respondents believed in the statement
Ebola does not exist, a higher proportion believed that
the outbreak was fabricated for financial gains or to
destabilize the region
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Wilkinson &
Fairhead

2017

Sierra
Leone &
Guinea

Stearns

2012

DRC;
North Kivu
Province

- Low levels of trust in government institutions and
widespread belief in misinformation
-Local authorities were more trusted than city,
provincial, or national authorities
-Researchers concluded that low institutional trust and
belief in misinformation are indicators or a low
likelihood of adherence to EVD preventative measures
-When the epidemic hit the chiefs in Sierra Leone had
legitimacy that the leaders in Guinea did not have and
they were better able to facilitate trust between the
community and international humanitarian
organizations
-The differences in French direct rule and British indirect rule may be a contributing factor as to why
Guinea had more instances of over resistance
compared to Sierra Leone
-Prolonged violence experienced in the region since
liberation in 1960
-There has been long standing conflict between ethnic
groups such as those who consider themselves
“indigenous,” and Hutu and Tutsi immigrants from
Rwanda
-Armed actors in the region have been backed by local
elite and foreign governments

Manuscript
Introduction
EVD is zoonotic with frequent spillovers into humans, non-human primates, and other
animal populations. There is evidence to support the claim that the natural host for EVD is bats,
particularly bats belonging to the Pteropodidae family; however, there has yet to be virus isolated
from bats found in natural conditions.2 Humans are likely infected by coming into close contact
with bats or other deceased animals such as chimpanzees or other wild game. After the initial
spillover event, the disease can be spread by human-to-human transmission via bodily fluids.
Caring for those who are sick or coming into close contact with dead bodies is associated with a
high risk for disease transmission because of the likelihood of coming into direct contact with
bodily fluids.2 Because bodily fluids are very infectious, the risk of nosocomial transmission is
very high; therefore, it is essential that appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) be used
when treating EVD patients. The incubation period is 2-21 days, and there are three phases of the
disease. Phase one is defined by an acute non-specific viral illness where patients will experience
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symptoms such as malaise, fatigue, and body aches.2,3 During the second phase of the disease is
dominated by gastrointestinal symptoms such as nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea, at this stage
many patients will become dehydrated.2,3 After the second week of illness, some patients will
begin to recover; however some will begin to deteriorate among those who do not recover,
patients will proceed to the third stage, which is shock possibly due to hypovolaemia and a
systemic inflammatory response, some patients may also experience neurological manifestations
during this stage.2,3 At this point, some patients will begin to experience hemorrhage; however,
during the 2013-2016 West Africa outbreak, this wasn’t common.2 Many other common diseases
can have similar symptoms as EVD such as influenza, malaria, or typhoid fever.4
On July 28, 2018 a notification was sent from the North Kivu Provincial Health division to
the Ministry of Health in the Democratic Republic of Congo detailing a cluster of acute
hemorrhagic fever cases.5 On August 1, 2018 the Institut National de Recherche Biomédicale
(INRB) in Kinshasa reported that of the six samples that were collected from the patients who
were hospitalized Mabalako Health Zone in North Kivu, four tested positive for EVD.5 This
marked the beginning of the 10th outbreak of EVD in the DRC since it’s discovery in 1976. The
outbreak in the North Kivu Province was officially declared on August 1, 2018 one week after
the 9th outbreak in the Équateur province was declared as ending.
There are several reasons why the outbreak in North Kivu and Ituri Provinces is unique. One
being that North Kivu province is one of the most populous provinces in the DRC with 8 million
inhabitants and shares a border with not only four other provinces in the DRC (Ituri, South Kivu,
Maniema, and Tshopo) but it also shares a border with Uganda and Rwanda.6 Second being that
this outbreak is occurring in a conflict zone. The eastern region of the DRC has experienced
sustained violence since the 1960s when the DRC gained its independence from Belgium. There
were at least 40 armed groups active in the eastern DRC as of October 2013.7 Due to the
prolonged and sustained violence there is an atmosphere of mistrust among communities of the
Ebola response efforts.8 This mistrust and suspicion have fueled the violence in the region. Due
to this violence there are an estimated 1 million internally displaced persons in the region and a
continuous exodus of refugees to neighboring countries such as Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania.6
Third, not only is the region experiencing an EVD outbreak it is also co-currently experiencing
cholera, monkeypox, and vaccine-derived polio virus type 2 outbreaks.9
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The purpose of this study is to have a better understanding of how this violence towards
health care services has impacted the country’s ability to contain this outbreak. It is important to
understand how often these attacks are happening, what resources are they affecting, and when
these attacks reached their peak. The intent of this thesis is to quantify the frequency of attacks
on health care sourced from publicly available data to have a better understanding of the
dynamics of this EVD outbreak and the impact violence is having on the containment of this
outbreak.
Methods
Study Design
This study was a cross-sectional examination of data collected via multiple publicly
available resources.
Data Sources
The data was obtained from several publicly available resources and then matched to
incidents reported in the Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA) provided
publicly by the World Health Organization (WHO). Incidents were matched based on the date of
the incident, time the incident occurred, affected resources, and any injuries/deaths. Sources used
to gather incidents can be broken down into five categories listed below. If incidents were unable
to be matched to an incident reported in the SSA, they were still included in the data set if they
affected any aspect of the EVD response. Figure 1. Displays the dataset creation process and
Table 2. Displays the breakdown of sources used.
Search Process and Dataset Creation Process
The search process for data began by pulling data from the WHO SSA. Next a review of
all publicly published DRC Ministry of Health (MoH) reports since the declaration of the
outbreak in August 2018. The MoH published reports on the EVD outbreak from August 2018 –
July 20, 2019 when the Ebola response efforts were handed over to the office of the President of
the DRC. After this, a detailed review was also conducted of Helen Branswell’s twitter feed for
Ebola related tweets from August 2018 – January 2020. An extensive search for Ebola Related
Articles took place on three local media outlets websites: Actulite.CD, Radio Moto, and Afrique
la libre, news articles were translated from French to English using google translate. Data was
also extracted from Kivu Security Project that was accessed multiple times from August 2019 –
February 2020. Data was also extracted from The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
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Project; data was pulled during the month of January 2020.25 Insecurity Insight’s attacks on
Ebola Response Monthly News Briefs were also reviewed from August 2018 – January 2020.2539

A search was also done on ProMed-Mail for Ebola related entries from August 2018 – January

2020. All external WHO situation reports published from August 2018 – January 2020 were
reviewed, as were Weekly Bulletin’s on Outbreaks and Other Emergencies published by the
WHO Africa Office. A search was also done for all EVD related articles published by CIDRAP
from August 2018 – January 2020.
Table 2. Summary of data sources used for dataset creation
Type
Sources
International and national news
-Actualite.CD
-Radio Moto
-Afrique la libre
Non-profit organizations
-Kivu Security Project
-The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
Project (ACLED)
-Insecurity Insight
-ProMed-Mail
Public health organizations
-WHO Situation Reports
-Weekly Bulletin on Outbreaks and Other
Emergencies, WHO Africa Office
-DRC Ministry of Health
Social Media
-STAT news contributor Helen Branswell’s
twitter feed
Universities
-University of Minnesota, Center for
Infectious Disease Research and Policy
(CIDRAP)
Variables
For this analysis there were four main variables of interest: date, province, affected health
care resource, and perpetrator of attack. Date of the incident was assigned as the date in which
the attack took place. If the attack took place overnight and lasted into the next day, the date in
which the attack began was used as the date of the attack. Province was assigned according to
which province the attack took place in.
Affected health care resource was a variable assigned by the SSA. For attacks that could
be matched to attacks in the SSA, the affected health care resource for that assigned attack was
used. If the attack could not be matched to any attack that was recorded in the SSA, that attack
was still included in the data set and was assigned an affected health care resource based on the
description of the attack. For example, if looters stole supplies and set on fire a treatment center
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it was assigned the health care facilities affected health care resource. If there was no mention of
health care personnel directly being impacted by the event, they were not included in the affected
health care resource.
Perpetrators of attacks on healthcare were broken up into six groups which were defined
as: Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Community Members, Mai-Mai Militia, and Unknown
Perpetrators. Attacker identity was assigned according to the details provided by the source of
the information. If the source indicated ADF was behind the attack, ADF was, therefore,
identified as the attacker. If any Mai-Mai Militia was responsible for an attack they were grouped
as Mai-Mai Militia. Because of the amount of different Mai-Mai Militias in the region they were
all grouped together for simplicity. If there was indication that the perpetrators of the attack were
family members of an EVD victim, or just general community members that attack was assigned
to the Community Members group. If the group was classified as unknown in the source details
the attacker was classified as unknown. This is because based on the information available the
perpetrator cannot be classified as belonging to a group. Unknown perpetrators could be armed
or unarmed groups.
Statistical Methods
Microsoft Excel was used to create the data set, organize data and create graphs. SAS 9.4
was used for performing statistical analysis.
Results
There were 425 attacks on healthcare reported to the WHO SSA in the DRC from August
2018 – January 2020. Of those 425 attacks on health care 65 (15.29%) were suspected to have
been towards the EVD response. Outside of accounts reported to the WHO SSA an additional 37
attacks were added to this dataset for a total of 102 attacks on health care. These attacks were
focused on the EVD response and could not be assigned to any reports in the SSA. North Kivu
province experienced the most attacks with 80 (78.43%) attacks, Ituri had 22 (21.57%) attacks.
Between August 1, 2018 and January 31, 2020 there were an average of 1.26 attacks per week
(SD 1.55, median 1), and an average of 5.67 attacks per month (SD 3.58, median 6). For the 12
months that had reported attacks between August 2018 – January 2020, there was an average
18.60% increase in attacks each month Table. 3 shows the percent increase or decrease in
reported incidents for each month, as well as the number of reported cases each month.
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The peak of violent attacks occurred in May 2019 with 14 attacks being confirmed during
that month, followed by February 2019 with 10 attacks confirmed during that month. For Ituri
Province there was two peaks of violent attacks, the first peak was in June 2019, 4 (18.18%), the
second was in October 2019, 4 (18.18%). For North Kivu Province the peak occurred during
May 2019, 13 (16.25%) attacks. The peak of attacks per week for both provinces was during
week 42 (October 14 – 20, 2019), with 7 (6.86%) attacks. For Ituri Province the violent attacks
peaked during week 42 (14 – 20 October 2019) with 4 (18.18%) attacks. For North Kivu
Province there were two weeks, the first week was week 9 (February 25 – March 3, 2019) with 5
(6.25%) attacks, the next peak was during week 52 (December 23 – 29, 2019) with 5 (6.25%)
attacks as well.
There were several different attackers that were noted as perpetrators of this violence
during this outbreak and they were broken down into six groups which are: Allied Democratic
Forces (ADF), Community Members, Mai-Mai Militia, and Unknown Perpetrators. The main
force behind the violent attacks for both provinces was the Unknown Perpetrators Group with 39
(38.24%) attacks. However, the main force behind attacks in Ituri province was both the general
population with 8 (36.36%), and Mai-Mai Militia 8 (36.36%) compared to North Kivu Province,
where the main force behind attacks was overwhelmingly the Unknown Perpetrator Group 34
(42.50). The entire breakdown of perpetrators of violence can be found in Table 4. There was no
evidence of violent attacks towards the EVD response in South Kivu province from August 2018
– January 2020. Figures 1 – 3 show the distribution of attacks against health care and EVD cases
by date of illness onset for August 2018 – January 2020.
There were several resources that were impacted by attacks on health care. In each attack
more than one resource could be affected. The frequency of all affected resources is displayed in
Table 5. The three most affected resources were health care facilities 56 (37.09%), followed by
health care personnel 50 (33.12%), and health care transport 17 (11.26%).
Out of 102 confirmed incidents there were 15 reported deaths, 31 reported injuries (one
injury occurred among a healthcare worker’s spouse), 22 abductions (4 of these abductions were
of patients). Ituri province accounted for 4 (26.67%) deaths, while North Kivu province had 11
(73.33%) deaths. Ituri province accounted for 11 (35.48%) injuries, while North Kivu province
accounted for 20 (64.52%) injuries, including one civilian injury.
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To assess how long EVD response operations were delayed after major attacks on health
care, all the above sources were used to identify times in which some aspect of the response
stopped. Because the response efforts are so complex and multi-faceted, any event that impacted
any aspect of the response was counted. If there was no date mentioned in which response efforts
resumed it was assumed that the response was impacted one day only. All together the response
was halted for 103 days between August 2018 – January 2020.
Discussion
The amount of attacks against health care services in the DRC during this EVD outbreak
has had a substantial impact on bringing this outbreak to an end. In a study by Wells and
colleagues, researchers attempted to evaluate the spatial dynamics of Ebola transmission and to
quantify the impact of vaccination on the Ebola outbreak in Équateur province DRC.
Researchers concluded that the ring vaccination helped bring the outbreak under control.40 Wells
and colleagues stated that if the vaccination campaign had been delayed by one week, the
reduction in risk in the area where the outbreak occurred would have dropped from a 70.4%
reduction to 33.3% reduction.40 The study conducted by Wells and colleagues highlights the
importance of being able to implement vaccine campaigns in an appropriate amount of time to
reduce the risk of EVD. During the outbreak in North Kivu and Ituri provinces the same vaccine
was used as in the Équateur province outbreak, recombinant vesicular stomatitis virus (rVSV)vectored vaccine for Ebola Virus Disease (rVSV-ZEBOV).40 However, even though the same
vaccine and vaccination strategy, ring vaccination, were used this outbreak has lasted
substantially longer than the Équateur province outbreak and has lead to more cases and deaths.
There were several instances during the North Kivu and Ituri province of the EVD
response being halted because of attacks. This halt of the response efforts resulted in some
aspects of the response being put on hold, and in some circumstances, vaccination of contact
(ring vaccination) was put on hold. Altogether, there were 103 days of delayed response efforts.
Time and time again, in the MoH reports, and in the WHO reports, there has been a commentary
on community reluctance – specifically reluctance of contacts to get vaccinated, and sometimes
this reluctance has resulted in violence.24 There were also numerous examples of violence toward
safe and dignified burial teams. Safe and dignified burials are essential to stop the spread of EVD
because the body is so contagious after death.24-39
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Not only were the response efforts severely delayed it was clear that health care facilities
were also significantly impacted with 37.09% of all affected resources being health care
facilities. It is essential that during an Ebola outbreak patients’ have adequate access health care
facilities to reduce the amount of community spread. It is also important to note that the peak
month, and the peak week varied when comparing Ituri and North Kivu provinces, and the
amount of deaths, abductions, and injuries were greater in North Kivu province than in Ituri
province.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. One limitation is that there is no way that there can be
absolute certainty that an attack that was matched to an incident in the WHO’s Surveillance
System for Attacks on Health care is in fact that incident. The WHO only provides country level
information on each incident; therefore, there is no way to be certain that an event reported in the
surveillance system happened to the EVD response teams in the eastern part of the country.
Second limitation is that even though 102 attacks were identified, there is likely to be
more attacks than reported here. Numerous attacks against health care personnel were recorded
in the WHO’s Surveillance System for Attacks on health care as psychological threats of
violence. It is very rare to see any sort of threat or intimidation reported on in the sources used to
gather information. There were mentions of threats against health care workers but not specific
incidents, therefore, the estimates made here are likely to be an underestimation of the actual
magnitude of violence towards health care during this outbreak.
Third, there were several assumptions made here during this analysis and they will surely
have a significant impact on the results shown here. One of the assumptions made during the
attempt to assess the impact that major violent events had one the EVD response was that if there
was not a date that could be found in which response operations resumed it was assumed that the
response was only delayed for one day. This is likely an underestimation of the impact of attacks
on the response.
Conclusion
While the outbreak currently appears to be coming to an end, this EVD outbreak has
shown that the world is underprepared for an outbreak of such a virulent disease in an area
experiencing active conflict. It also demonstrates that even though there have been massive
efforts to educate the public on the lethality of EVD and the importance of seeking prompt care,
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there is still some reluctance in the population to seek care. This reluctance can result in violence
towards health care workers participating in the response efforts. Violence that targets response
efforts hampers the ability to contain the outbreak.
Our study, one of the first, to demonstrate the prevalence and context of violent attacks
related to health care resources and delivery during a health crisis indicate need for deliberate
planning and preventative measures when mitigating an infectious disease outbreak during an
active conflict.
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Figure 1. Dataset creation process using WHO SSA and other data sources

Figure 2. EVD incidence by week of illness onset and number of attacks on healthcare by week
of occurrence for both provinces.
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Figure 3. EVD incidence by week of illness onset in North Kivu Province and attacks on health
care in North Kivu Province
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Figure 4. EVD incidence by week of illness onset in Ituri Province and attacks on health care in
Ituri Province
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Table 3. Number of attacks on health care by province, month and year and percent change in
number of attacks for combined provinces for each month
Province
Total
Percent
(N) (%)
(N) (%)
Change
Year
Month
Ituri
North Kivu
August
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
September
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
0 (0.00)
2018
October
0 (0.00)
2 (1.96)
2 (1.96)
November
0 (0.00)
3 (2.94)
3 (2.94)
+50.00
December
0 (0.00)
4 (3.92)
4 (3.92)
+33.33
January
2 (1.96)
1 (0.98)
3 (2.94)
-25.00

2019

2020
Total

February

1 (0.98)

9 (8.82)

10 (9.80)

+233.33

March

0 (0.00)

6 (5.88)

6 (5.88)

-40.00

April

1 (0.98)

6 (5.88)

7 (6.86)

+16.67

May

1 (0.98)

13 (12.75)

14 (13.73)

+100.00

June

4 (3.92)

3 (2.94)

7 (6.86)

-41.18

July
August
September
October
November

0 (0.00)
1 (0.98)
2 (1.96)
4 (3.92)
3 (2.94)

5 (4.90)
6 (5.88)
6 (5.88)
5 (4.90)
5 (4.90)

5 (4.90)
7 (6.86)
8 (7.84)
9 (8.82)
8 (7.84)

-28.57
+40.00
+14.29
+12.50
-11.11

December
January

2 (1.96)
1 (0.98)
22 (21.57)

4 (3.92)
2 (1.96)
80 (78.43)
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6 (5.88)
3 (2.94)
102 (100.00)

-25.00
-50.00

Table 4. Types of actors perpetrating attacks on health care by province
Province
(N) (%)
Ituri
North Kivu
Attacker
Allied Democratic Forces
1 (0.98)
5 (4.90)

Total
(N) (%)
6 (5.88)

Community Members

8 (7.94)

22 (21.57)

30 (29.41)

Mai Mai Militia

8 (7.92)

19 (18.63)

27 (26.47)

Unknown Perpetrators

5 (4.90)

34 (33.33)

39 (38.24)

22 (21.57)

80 (78.43)

102 (100)

Total

Type 5. Number of affected health care resource during each attack on health care by province
Province
(N) (%)
Resource
Health care facilities
Health care personnel
Health care transport
Health care supplies/assets
Health care warehouse/storage
Health care patients
Total

Ituri

North Kivu

14 (9.15)
13 (8.50)
4 (2.61)
6 (3.92)
0 (0.00)
1 (0.65)
38 (24.84)

46 (30.07)
40 (26.14)
15 (9.80)
11 (7.19)
1 (0.65)
2 (1.31)
115 (75.16)

*More than one health care resource can be impacted during every attack
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Total*
(N) (%)
60 (39.22)
53 (34.64)
19 (12.42)
17 (11.11)
1 (0.65)
3 (1.96)
153 (100.00)

